
Environment and competition in public procurement

Claudine Desrieux*¹

¹Centre de Recherches en Économie et Droit (CRED) – Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas, Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas : EA7321 – 21, Rue Valette 75005 Paris, France

Résumé

The European legislation on public procurement has been modified over the past few years to favor "green" public procurement. This raises the question of the goal of public procurement regulation: while the best value for money is traditionally considered as the main concern of public procurement procedure, secondary goals have kept on growing (support for SMEs, environmental policy, ...) over the years. We use data from TED database to investigate whether environmental clauses in public procurement contracts are associated with lower competition indicators. Exploring French public procurement contracts between 2016 and 2020, our first results show that green contractual clauses are associated with a higher number of candidates during the call for tenders, a lower competitive pressure and a lower ability of SMEs to win. However, the weight allocated to the green criterium is crucial in the analysis: when it is low, the number of competitors increases and this has positive effect on prices. When this weight is high, there are a fewer bidders, a lower price competitive pressure but a higher probability that a SME wins.

Mots-Clés: Green public procurement, competition, contracts

*Intervenant